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Introduction: Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) provide important information about
the sensitivity of the brain to process varying risks. The aim of the present study
was to determine how different risk levels are reflected in decision-related ERPs,
namely the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P300. Materials and Methods:
Twenty participants conducted a probabilistic two-choice gambling task while an
electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. Choices were provided between a low-risk
option yielding low rewards and low losses and a high-risk option yielding high rewards and
high losses. While options differed in expected risks, they were equal in expected values
and in feedback probabilities. Results: At the behavioral level, participants were generally
risk-averse but modulated their risk-taking behavior according to reward history. An early
positivity (P200) was enhanced on negative feedbacks in high-risk compared to low-risk
choices. With regard to the FRN, there were significant amplitude differences between
positive and negative feedbacks on high-risk choices, but not on low-risk choices. While
the FRN on negative feedbacks did not vary with decision riskiness, reduced amplitudes
were found for positive feedbacks in high-risk relative to low-risk choices. P300 amplitudes
were larger in high-risk decisions, and in an additive way, after negative compared to
positive feedback. Discussion: The present study revealed significant influences of risk
and valence processing on ERPs. FRN findings suggest that the reward prediction error
signal is increased after high-risk decisions. The increased P200 on negative feedback in
risky decisions suggests that large negative prediction errors are already processed in the
P200 time range. The later P300 amplitude is sensitive to feedback valence as well as
to the risk associated with a decision. Thus, the P300 carries additional information for
reward processing, mainly the enhanced motivational significance of risky decisions.
Keywords: decision-making, feedback processing, P200, P300, FRN
INTRODUCTION
A significant function of the human brain is to assess the risk-
iness of decisions in order to prevent negative outcomes. Brain
imaging studies indicate that frontolimbic brain circuits involv-
ing the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, insula, ventral
striatum, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), are implicated in
risk processing. In particular, the ACC is important for detect-
ing and evaluating unfavorable outcomes (Bush et al., 2000; Luu
et al., 2000), and for risk assessment (Ernst et al., 2004; Fukui
et al., 2005; McCoy and Platt, 2005). Greater ACC activity pre-
dicts enhanced error avoidance (Johansen and Fields, 2004; Frank
et al., 2005) and less risk-taking behavior (Paulus and Frank,
2006). An influential model of decision-making under risk is the
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). It proposes that
human decision makers are generally risk avoiding when choos-
ing between alternatives. Nevertheless, it has been shown that
risk-taking behavior may also depend on the context (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981), i.e., risk aversion increases after gains and
decreases after losses.
Studies using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) have
revealed that the human brain is able to evaluate the outcome of
actions within a few 100ms. Specific brain potentials are elicited
by self-generated responses and performance feedback (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002). The error-related negativity (ERN; Falkenstein
et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1990) and the feedback-related neg-
ativity (FRN; Miltner et al., 1997) are elicited by erroneous
responses and by negative feedback or losses, respectively. ERN
and FRN are assumed to originate from the anterior midcin-
gulate cortex (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Debener et al.,
2005). Therefore, ERN and FRN may reflect similar mechanisms
of monitoring and controlling behavior. It has been suggested
that the ACC uses reinforcement learning (RL) signals conveyed
by the midbrain dopamine system to optimize future decision-
making behavior (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). According to the
RL theory, ERN and FRN reflect a reward prediction error sig-
nal in the ACC that occurs when ongoing events are worse than
expected. Subsequently, the ACC triggers an adaptive modifi-
cation of behavior by relating actions with their consequences
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Rushworth et al., 2004). Another
ERP component that has been shown to carry important infor-
mation for reward processing is the feedback-related P300, a
parietally distributed positivity (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Polezzi
et al., 2009). It has been suggested that the feedback-related P300
may reflect the extent to which information is motivationally
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significant or salient (for a review, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).
In line with that, the P300 amplitude varies with the motivational
significance of feedback information (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004;
Polezzi et al., 2009) and is increased in individuals who attributed
more meaning to feedback (de Bruijn et al., 2004).
Economic decision theories presume that risk depends on
potential losses and increases with its probability and magnitude
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Brown and Braver, 2007). In this
regard, rational decisions are made on the basis of the expected
value, which is a multiplicative combination of the two compo-
nents (Machina, 1982). Recent studies investigated the different
components of risk-taking by assessing the influences of feed-
back valence, magnitude, and probability on ERP amplitudes.
Research on the impact of the probability of feedback has gen-
erally shown that both the FRN and the P300 are modulated
by this variable, with unexpected feedback being associated with
enhanced amplitudes (Holroyd et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2007).
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that amplitudes are modu-
lated by an interaction between feedback valence and expectancy:
unexpected negative feedback is associated with larger amplitudes
compared to unexpected positive feedback (Frank et al., 2005;
Moser and Simons, 2009). In gambling paradigms, an additional
important variable associated with decision-making under risk is
outcome magnitude. Yeung and Sanfey (2004) studied the effects
of winning or losing large or small amounts of money on the
FRN and P300 and concluded that only the P300 was affected
by the amount of monetary loss, whereas the FRN was insen-
sitive to outcome magnitude. In line with this, Toyomaki and
Murohashi (2005) reported effects of magnitude on the partic-
ipants’ subjective assessment of losses, but no effects on FRN
amplitudes (see also Sato et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2006). Other
studies reported significant magnitude effects on the FRN (Goyer
et al., 2008; Wu and Zhou, 2009). However, tasks in these studies
required participants to choose from alternatives without hav-
ing any information about reward magnitude. To conclude, FRN
and P300 seem to reflect different aspects of risk processing in
economic decision-making, valence and magnitude processing,
respectively.
A limitation of most previous studies is that they did not
independently control for the effects of probability, magnitude,
and expected value. Some studies focusing on neural correlates
of feedback processing used different expected values of choices
to determine learning (van der Helden et al., 2010; Schuermann
et al., 2011). Furthermore, sometimes participants were unaware
of possible outcome magnitudes prior to receiving feedback, and
thus could notmake informed choices (Goyer et al., 2008;Wu and
Zhou, 2009). Finally, for gambling tasks, choices often differed
in outcome probability (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Cohen et al.,
2007). To overcome some of these limitations, we designed a gam-
bling task in which expected risk was independently manipulated
from expected values and reward probability. Specifically, partici-
pants were requested to select between a low-risk option yielding
low rewards and low losses and a high-risk option yielding high
rewards and high losses. Unlike traditional RL tasks used in ERP
research, participants in the present task were not required to
learn outcome contingencies throughout the course of the task. In
this study, expected values were equal for both options. There was
also no difference in reward probabilities between the low-risk
and the high-risk option. Examining risk effects also requires that
probabilities involved in a decision are explicitly known (Brand
et al., 2006; Brown and Braver, 2007). Therefore, in the present
task participants were informed about the outcome probabili-
ties. In sum, the present task should provide a better account to
assess pure risk preference and to evaluate the influence of risk
parameters on ERPs.
The aim of the present study was to determine how differ-
ent risk levels are reflected in decision-related ERPs, namely the
FRN and the feedback-related P300. Therefore, we developed and
tested a novel two-choice gambling task allowing for the examina-
tion of risk-taking in unambiguous situations (Pilot experiment).
The associated electrocortical indicators of risk-taking behav-
ior were examined in the main experiment. Considering that
expected values of high-risk and low-risk options were equal,
we predicted that participants are predominantly risk-averse,
namely that they are less willing to choose risky options (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981). Furthermore, we assumed that partici-
pants are more risk-averse following gains and relatively more
risk-seeking following losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
According to the RL theory, which states that the FRN responds to
the difference between experienced and anticipated rewards, we
predicted enhanced FRN amplitudes for high-risk compared to
low-risk decisions. We also assumed that P300 amplitudes would
be enhanced for high-risk decisions compared to low-risk ones
due to an enhanced motivation of risky decisions (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005).
PILOT EXPERIMENT
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty participants (30 women and 20 men) took part in the pilot
experiment. Their mean age was 30.5 years (SD: 11.4; range:
18–50). Three of the participants were left-handed. Participants
had no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases. All partici-
pants received verbal and written explanations of the purpose and
procedures of the study, and gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Task and procedure
A computerized probabilistic two-choice gambling task was
administered, which involved low-risk and high-risk options. On
each trial participants were asked to choose between two options
that were presented on a computer screen (see Figure 1). The col-
ors of the stimuli indicated the relative probability of winning
(green), which was always 75%, and the relative probability of
losing (red), which was always 25%. Reward magnitudes associ-
ated with choice options were displayed in each stimulus. Choices
were made by pressing one of two corresponding response but-
tons. After 700ms, participants were shown the outcome asso-
ciated with the selected option for 1100ms. A red frowny face
together with a negative amount indicated negative feedback,
while a green smiley face together with a positive amount indi-
cated positive feedback. In addition, the total account balance
across trials was presented below the feedback stimuli. Choices
had to be made within 2300ms, otherwise participants were
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of the probabilistic two-choice
gambling task. During each trial, participants were asked to
choose between two options that were represented visually by a
histogram. The colors of the histogram indicated the relative probability
of gaining (colored green) which was always 75% and the relative
probability of losing (colored red) which was always 25%. The current
amount of gains and losses associated with each option were displayed
in each histogram. Choices were made by pressing one of two
corresponding response buttons. After 700ms, participants were
shown the outcome associated with their choice for 1100ms. A red
frowny face together with a negative amount indicated negative
feedback, while a green smiley face together with a positive amount
indicated positive feedback. In addition, the current total amount was
presented below the feedback stimuli.
prompted to respond more quickly. The next trial was presented
after an intertrial interval of 750–950ms. Following standardized
written instructions, participants performed two practice trials.
The pilot experiment consisted of 112 total trials and lasted about
5min. Participants were instructed to earn as many points as pos-
sible and were told that each point corresponds to one Euro cent.
Participants received on average 4.50C in the pilot experiment.
Table 1 presents an overview of the reinforcement schedule. In
each trial, participants always had to choose between options A
and B (56 trials) or options C and D (56 trials). The options with
the larger maximum outcomes were termed as high-risk (options
B and D), and the options with the smaller maximum outcomes
were termed as low-risk (options A and C). Positions of options
on the computer screen changed across trials in pseudo-random
order. At the beginning of the pilot experiment, participants
were informed that presented options differed in expected risks,
while the expected values were equal for high-risk and low-risk
options. According to Brown and Braver (2007), expected risk
of each option was defined as [loss probability × (rewards –
Table 1 | Reinforcement schedule in the probabilistic two-choice
gambling task.
Low-risk High-risk Low-risk High-risk
options options options options
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Reward (75%) +7 +43 +8 +120
Losses (25%) −9 −117 −12 −348
Expected risk −0,5 −18,5 −1 −57
Expected value 3 3 3 3
losses)], expected value of each option was defined as [(reward
probability× rewards)+ (loss probability× losses)].
Data analyses
To assess risk-taking behavior, percentages (relative to the total
amount of choices) of low-risk (options A and C) and high-
risk choices (options B and D) were determined and analyzed
using two-tailed t-tests. Percentages of low-risk and high-risk
choices were further analyzed as a function of total account bal-
ance (positive account balance; i.e., >0C vs. negative account
balance; i.e., <0C), performing two-tailed t-tests. Moreover, we
analyzed whether the probability of high-risk choices on a given
trial varied as a function of prior feedback valence and prior
risk-taking behavior. This was done with an ANOVA with the
within-subject factors previous feedback valence (gains vs. losses
on the previous trial) and previous risk-taking (low-risk options
vs. high-risk options on the previous trial). Statistical analysis was
carried out with the Predictive Analytic Software (PASW) 19.0 for
Windows.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the behavioral results. A significant preference
for the low-risk options over the high-risk options was found
throughout the task, [t(49) = 2.84, p = 0.007]. The analysis of
risk-taking as a function of actual account balance revealed that
participants avoided high-risk options when their current bal-
ance was positive, [t(49) = 4.71, p < 0.001]. By contrast, high-risk
options were preferred when the current balance was negative,
[t(49) = 4.05, p < 0.001]. Further, it was shown that risk prefer-
ence varied as a function of prior feedback valence, [F(1, 49) =
25.62, p < 0.001], and prior risk-taking, [F(1, 49) = 14.85, p <
0.001]. The interaction of feedback valence and prior risk-taking
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Table 2 | Behavioral results of the pilot experiment (N = 50) and the main experiment (N = 20) presenting mean (M) and standard
deviation (SD).
Low-risk options High-risk options T df p
M (%) SD (%) M (%) SD (%)
PILOT EXPERIMENT
− 56.9 17.2 43.1 17.2 2.84 49 0.007
Positive balance 49.1 18.1 29.5 13.9 4.71 49 0.000
Negative balance 7.7 8.4 13.6 8.4 −4.05 49 0.000
MAIN EXPERIMENT
− 59.2 19.7 40.8 19.7 2.09 19 0.050
Positive balance 49.0 20.4 26.3 13.5 3.15 19 0.005
Negative balance 10.1 8.3 14.5 8.4 −1.75 19 0.096
Note: Percentages of low-risk and high-risk choices were analyzed as a function of total account balance (positive account balance; i.e., > 0€ vs. negative account
balance; i.e., < 0€), performing two-tailed t-tests.
was not significant, [F(1, 49) < 1, p = 0.970]. These effects reflect
that participants preferred higher risks following losses than fol-
lowing gains, as well as following a high-risk decision as compared
to a low-risk decision.
DISCUSSION
With this pilot experiment we aimed to explore risk-taking behav-
ior using a probabilistic two-choice gambling task. During each
trial, participants were required to choose between options asso-
ciated with two different risk levels. As expected, participants pre-
ferred the low-risk options over the high-risk options, although
options did not differ with respect to expected values. Results
are consistent with previous findings of Polezzi et al. (2008).
In that study, participants had to choose between a predictable
option (which was always associated with a gain of 10C) and
an unpredictable option (which was associated with a gain of
30C or a loss of 10C). The results showed a clear preference
for options associated with a predictable outcome, although the
expected value of both options was identical. Analysis of the
choice history also revealed a loss avoidance tendency among
participants. Participants strongly avoided the high-risk options
following gains and when they had positive balances. This was not
the case after losses and with negative account balances. When
faced with rewarding feedback, participants were possibly more
willing to protect the money they had and thus showed more
conservative behavior. By contrast, the increase in risk procliv-
ity might occur due to an anticipation of larger monetary rewards
in order to reduce negative consequences (in terms of corrective
actions). These findings are in line with previous studies (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Goyer et al., 2008), showing that partici-
pants are more likely to engage in risky choices following losses.
In summary, the pilot experiment demonstrated the usefulness
of the two-choice gambling task as a suitable test for examining
risk-taking behavior in unambiguous situations.
MAIN EXPERIMENT
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
20 participants (five men) attended in the ERP study. Their mean
age was 29.5 years (SD: 8.9; range, 21–52). All participants were
right-handed and had no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders. All participants received verbal and written explana-
tions of the purpose and procedures of the study, and gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants gave written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Task and procedure
Task and procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to the pilot
experiment except that it comprised of 640 trials that were divided
into three blocks with short breaks between blocks. Again, posi-
tions of high and low-risk options (left or right on the screen)
varied across trials in pseudo-random order. In each trial, par-
ticipants had to chose between options A and B (320 trials), or
options C and D (320 trials). The increase in trial number was
necessary to obtain a sufficient number of trials for ERP analyses
in all conditions. The experiment lasted about 40min. All partic-
ipants were paid 15C for their participation. To ensure ecological
validity of the task and to enhance motivation, participants were
informed that they would additionally receive the highest amount
they earned in one of the three blocks. The average earning was
6.70C in this experiment.
EEG recording and data analyses
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 elec-
trodes sites including Cz as a recording reference, using an
equidistant electrode system (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching-
Breitbrunn, Germany). The montage also included additional
electrodes that were placed on external locations: below the left
and right eye (IO1 and IO2) and in the neck. The ground elec-
trode was located below T1. Electrode impedances were kept
below 5 k. Electrical activity was sampled digitally at a rate
of 500Hz, using a time constant of 10 s and a low-pass filter
of 250Hz. Individual electrode positions were digitized based
on the run-time measurement of ultrasonic pulses using ELPOS
(zebris Medical GmbH, Isny i. Allgäu, Germany). Offline, the
EEG data were re-referenced to average reference and corrected
for eye-movement artifacts using the multiple source eye cor-
rection method as implemented in BESA 5.1 (Brain Electrical
Source Analysis, MEGIS Software GmbH, Gräfelfing, Germany).
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For the FRN and P300 analyses, raw data were filtered offline
with a low-pass filter of 40Hz and an additional notch fil-
ter at 50Hz. Feedback-locked epochs were obtained for each
trial, starting 200ms prior to feedback onset and continuing
for 1000ms post-feedback. Individual averages were baseline-
corrected to an average activity between –200 and 0ms before
feedback onset. Feedback-locked epochs were excluded from fur-
ther analyses if they still contained artifacts. For each participant,
ERPs were averaged separately for feedback valance (positive
vs. negative) and risk levels (low-risk options vs. high-risk
options).
Three components were analyzed. The P200 is a positive com-
ponent peaking at around 200ms after feedback onset and mea-
sured over frontal areas (Carretié et al., 2001; Polezzi et al., 2008).
In the present study, the P200 was determined as the most posi-
tive peak between the time window of 100 to 300ms at electrodes
Fz and FCz. FRN amplitudes were computed as the difference
between the most negative peak following feedback onset in a
200 to 400ms time window and the preceding positive peak in
the 100 to 300ms time window at electrodes Fz and FCz. Prior
to peak detection, ERPs were filtered with a 15Hz low-pass filter.
The P300 was quantified at CPz and Pz and defined as the mean
amplitude in the time range between 300 and 400ms after feed-
back presentation. ERP time windows were based on the visual
inspection of the grand-average waveforms (for P200 and FRN:
Fz, for P300: Pz). Repeated-measurement ANOVAs were com-
puted for the analysis of ERP data, with the within-subject factors
electrode (for P200 and FRN: Fz and FCz, for P300: CPz and
Pz), feedback valence (gains vs. losses) and risk option (low-risk
options vs. high-risk options). Analyses of the behavioral data
were identical to the pilot experiment. Correlation coefficients
(Pearson r) were used to examine associations between FRN and
P300 magnitude and percentage of low-risk choices (relative to
the percentage of the high-risk choices). All statistical tests were
two-tailed.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
As in the pilot experiment, we found a preference for low-
risk options over high-risk options, [t(19) = 2.09, p = 0.050] (cf.
Table 2). The analysis of risk-taking as a function of account bal-
ance revealed that participants avoided high-risk options more
when their current balance was positive compared to when it was
negative, [t(19) = 3.15, p = 0.005]. Unlike the pilot data, partic-
ipants only tended to increase risk-taking behavior when their
current balance was negative compared to when it was posi-
tive, [t(19) = 1.76, p = 0.096]. Furthermore, it was found that the
proportion of chosen high-risk options varied as a function of
previous outcome valence and previous risk-taking. Consistent
with the pilot experiment, we found main effects for feed-
back valence, [F(1, 19) = 16.98, p = 0.001], and for risk-taking,
[F(1, 19) = 11.57, p = 0.003]. Following losses, participants made
more risky decisions than after gains. Following risky choices,
participants were more likely to choose a high-risk option than
after having made a low-risk choice. Finally, a significant interac-
tion was found between previous feedback valence and previous
risk-taking, indicating that most high-risk choices were made
after high-risk choices followed by negative feedback, [t(19) =
4.37, p < 0.001].
ERP results
Figure 2 presents feedback-locked ERP waveforms on positive
(dashed line) and on negative (solid line) feedback trials, sep-
arately for selected high-risk and low-risk options. Figure 3
displays ERPs for positive and negative feedback trials for a com-
parison of the high-risk (solid line) and low-risk options (dashed
line). Inspection of ERPs indicated three distinct components
related to risk processing. The first component is the P200, an
early positive wave peaking at a latency of approximately 200ms.
The FRN is the negative deflection between two positive compo-
nents. The third component is the P300, peaking approximately
between 300 and 400ms following feedback onset. Losses elicited
large P300 amplitudes which may overlap with the FRN effect.
It is noteworthy that ERP waveforms indicate that FRN peak
amplitudes were lower for losses than for gains which are mainly
due to the variation of P200 and P300 amplitudes. Therefore,
FRN amplitudes were calculated as the difference between the
most negative peak amplitude minus the preceding positive peak
amplitude. With regard the P200, a significant main effect of
valence was found, [F(1, 19) = 67.56, p < 0.001], indicating larger
amplitudes for losses compared to gains. There was also a signif-
icant main effect of risk, [F(1, 19) = 43.87, p < 0.001], revealing
enhanced amplitudes in high-risk options compared to low-risk
options. Furthermore, a significant interaction of risk and valence
was found, [F(1, 19) = 19.36, p < 0.001]. In high-risk decisions,
larger amplitude differences between positive and negative feed-
backs were found which was due to enhanced P200 amplitudes
on negative feedbacks in high-risk options. The main effect of
electrode was also significant, [F(1, 19) = 34.59, p < 0.001], with
larger P200 at FCz compared to Fz.
Consistent with previous findings, a main effect of valence
was found for FRN amplitudes, indicating enhanced FRN ampli-
tudes on losses compared to gains, [F(1, 19) = 11.08, p = 0.004].
Furthermore, the FRN was modulated by risk as evidenced
by a significant interaction between valence and risk option,
[F(1, 19) = 10.12, p= 0.005]. After choosing the high risk option,
large amplitude differences between losses and gains were found,
[t(19) = 4.03, p = 0.001]. By contrast, there was no significant
amplitude difference between losses and gains in the low-risk con-
dition, [t(19) = 1.08, p = 0.293]. While the FRN on losses did
not differ with respect to the riskiness of options, [t(19) = 0.65,
p = 0.522], amplitudes on gains were reduced in the high-risk
compared to the low-risk option, [t(19) = −3.55, p = 0.002]. The
main effect of electrode also approached significance, [F(1, 19) =
3.46, p = 0.079], due to larger FRN amplitudes at Fz relative
to FCz.
The P300 is also depicted in Figures 2 and 3. A main effect of
valence was found, [F(1, 19) = 18.06, p < 0.001], indicating that
the P300 was larger on losses compared to gains. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of risk option, [F(1, 19) = 36.08, p < 0.001],
showing enhanced amplitudes in high-risk compared to low-risk
choices. No significant interaction between feedback valence and
risk option was observed (F < 1). The P300 tended to be larger at
CPz compared to Pz, [F(1, 19) = 3.48, p = 0.078].
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FIGURE 2 | Feedback-related brain potential waveforms for high-risk
and low-risk decisions. Averaged feedback-locked event-related brain
potential (ERP) waveforms are presented for recording sites FCz and CPz.
ERPs for high-risk decisions are depicted in the left columns and for low-risk
decisions in the right column. Waveforms for negative feedback (solid line)
and for positive feedback (dashed line) are overlaid. The P200 was
determined as the most positive peak between 100 and 300ms.
The FRN was computed as the difference between the most negative peak
following feedback onset in a 200 to 400ms time window and the preceding
positive peak between 100 and 300ms. The P300 was defined as the mean
amplitude in the time range between 300 and 400ms after feedback
presentation.
Correlational findings
Bivariate correlations were computed relating ERPs following
losses and following gains (averaged across FCz and Fz for FRN
analyses, and across CPz and Pz for P300 analyses) to the percent-
age of low-risk choices. Negative correlations for FRN amplitudes
indicate an increase in FRN (i.e., more negative amplitudes) with
risk aversion.
We found significant correlations between risk avoidance and
FRN amplitudes on gains (r = −0.47, p = 0.039), the FRN on
losses at a trend level (r = −0.41, p = 0.073), and P300 ampli-
tudes on losses (r = 0.52, p = 0.018). No significant correlations
were found between risk-avoidance and P300 amplitudes after
gains. Note that FRN and P300 amplitudes were not correlated
(r = −0.02, p = 0.91).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study focused on decision-making and its neural
correlates using a monetarily motivated probabilistic two-choice
gambling task. In accordance with previous findings, partic-
ipants were generally risk-averse but modulated their risk-
taking behavior according to reward history (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981). ERP research on decision-making has left
the question unanswered as to how electrophysiological indica-
tors are specifically affected by different risk levels. In order to
address this issue, we independently controlled for different risk
parameters.
Differential processing of risky decisions was reflected in the
FRN amplitudes. The FRN was modulated by the well-known
distinction between gains and losses (Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Hajcak et al., 2006), but only in high-risk options.
Considered in the framework of the RL theory of the FRN
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002), it appears that the reward prediction
error signal is increased after high-risk decisions, where larger
potential positive and negative consequences were expected. The
null effect under the low-risk condition might be explained
by generally smaller reward prediction errors generated in the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 204 | 6
Schuermann et al. Feedback processing in decision-making
FIGURE 3 | Feedback-related brain potential waveforms for
positive (i.e., gains) and negative feedback (i.e., losses). Averaged
feedback-locked event-related brain potential (ERP) waveforms are
presented for recording sites FCz and CPz. ERPs for positive feedback
(i.e., gains) are depicted in the left columns and for negative
feedback (i.e., losses) in the right column. Waveforms for high-risk
decisions (solid line) and for low-risk-decisions (dashed line) are
overlaid.
low-risk condition, characterized by small positive and small neg-
ative outcomes. Results are also in line with Holroyd et al. (2004),
showing that the FRN reflects loss sizes in relation to what was
expected. Whereas Holroyd and Coles (2002) interpreted the
FRN purely as a reinforcement signal, Gehring and Willoughby
(2002) suggested that the FRN might also reflect the motiva-
tional impact of ongoing events. Thus, modulations in high-risk
decisions may also reflect the motivational or emotional signif-
icance of high-risk decisions compared with low-risk decisions.
Due to the potential negative consequences of high-risk choices,
discriminating between losses and gains seems highly important
for optimizing future decision-making. Consistent with this inter-
pretation, brain imaging studies emphasized the role of the ACC
in evaluating unfavorable outcomes (Bush et al., 2000; Luu et al.,
2000) and in risk assessment (Ernst et al., 2004; Fukui et al.,
2005). Also, cingulate lesions in monkeys have been shown to
impair the ability to use previous reinforcements to guide future
decision-making behavior (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Kennerley
et al., 2006). Alternatively, the FRN pattern in high-risk deci-
sions might be due to variations of the P200 which was also
affected by outcome valence. However, the P200 was enhanced
on negative feedback trials in high-risk options whereas the FRN
on negative feedbacks did not vary with risk. Interestingly, the
interaction of feedback valence and risk was mainly caused by
FRN amplitude variations on positive feedbacks. In the present
study, reduced amplitudes were found for positive feedbacks in
high-risk relative to low-risk choices. Larger amplitudes were
found for lower outcomes and for smaller positive reward pre-
diction errors. Our results contribute to a growing debate about
the relevance of positive feedback for reward-related processes
and several studies found greater modulation of amplitudes on
gain trials compared to loss trials (Cohen et al., 2007; Holroyd
et al., 2008). It has been shown that the amplitude following
positive feedbacks varied with the probability of reward. Thus
it was argued that it may represent the magnitude of the pos-
itive reward prediction error (Cohen et al., 2007). Possibly, the
current result of reduced FRN amplitudes in the high-risk condi-
tionmay be a consequence of the larger positive reward prediction
error associated with gains in that condition. However, few stud-
ies examined the effects on positive feedbacks, and consistent
patterns of results have not been observed yet. Therefore, these
results have to be interpreted with caution, and further studies
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are needed to examine the effects of reward prediction error on
different risk parameters.
Decision riskiness also affected the P200, a component that has
previously been associated with the attention processing of emo-
tional stimuli, such as faces. The more negative the valence, the
larger the P200 amplitude (Carretié et al., 2001, 2005). Consistent
with these findings, in the present study negative feedback (i.e.,
losses) and high-risk decisions induced larger P200s. The present
results indicate that amplitudes were modulated by outcome
magnitude, especially in high-risk gambles. Polezzi et al. (2008)
reported that unpredictable outcomes are associated with larger
P200 amplitudes compared to predictable outcomes, which is
consistent with the current results. But, in that study the P200
was not sensitive to the distinction between positive and nega-
tive outcome. Our data suggest an early processing of negative
feedback and of high-risk decisions. Also, Bellebaum et al. (2010)
revealed that P200 amplitudes are larger under a reward out-
come condition compared to a non-reward outcome condition
both in active and observational gambling tasks. Moreover, the
active execution induced a larger discrepancy of P200 amplitudes
between reward and non-reward than that of passive observation.
The present findings suggest an enhanced sensitivity in risky deci-
sions to the gain- and loss-outcome difference at a very early stage.
Importantly, we found large reward prediction errors in high-risk
options as early as in the P200 time range. Possibly, the P200
codes the most relevant features of a context, especially when
risky decisions have to be made in order to avoid future negative
consequences.
In agreement with previous studies (Frank et al., 2005;
Schuermann et al., 2011), P300 amplitudes were enhanced on
negative compared to positive feedbacks. In addition to valence
effects, enhanced P300 amplitudes were found in high-risk
options relative to low-risk options. Both results are in accor-
dance with the finding that the feedback-related P300 is sensitive
to reward probability (Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Pfabigan
et al., 2011) since negative outcomes were less probable in the
current study and with the finding that the P300 is sensitive
to reward magnitude since negative outcomes in the high-risk
condition were of greater magnitude (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004;
Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007). The P300 enhancement in high-risk
choices may reflect enhanced motivational significance of risky
decisions. This is supported by the hypothesis that the P300 may
reflect motivational processes linked to noradrenergic transmis-
sion (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).
Interestingly, FRN and P300 appear to reflect risk-taking
behavior, but they might reflect different aspects of risky decision-
making. Whereas FRN amplitudes are reduced by large pos-
itive prediction errors, P300 amplitudes are enhanced due to
larger negative outcomes. Importantly, risk-avoidance behav-
ior was associated with enhanced FRN and P300 amplitudes.
Possibly, increased FRN amplitudes reflect enhanced cognitive
control that is essential for the avoidance of risky decisions.
The association between FRN and risk-avoidance is in line
with previous findings, revealing an inverse relation between
ERN/FRN amplitudes and risk-taking behavior in healthy indi-
viduals (e.g., Hewig et al., 2007; Santesso and Segalowitz, 2009)
and in patients with borderline personality disorder (Ruchsow
et al., 2006; Schuermann et al., 2011). FRN findings comple-
ment brain imaging results, suggesting that greater ACC activity
predicts less risk-seeking behavior (Paulus and Frank, 2006).
Nonetheless, interpretation of correlation analyses of the present
study should be cautiously interpreted due to the relatively small
sample size.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that independently
controlled for different risk parameters. Nevertheless, there are
possible confounds that should be discussed. First, the compari-
son between positive and negative feedbacks is confounded with
feedback probability, i.e., positive feedbacks were more frequent
than negative feedbacks. Therefore, reward probability may have
influenced the difference between positive and negative feed-
backs (Holroyd et al., 2003; but: Hajcak et al., 2005). While this
should have affected the distinction between positive and negative
feedbacks in both conditions, an amplitude difference was only
found in the high-risk condition. In addition, feedback probabil-
ity should not affect the comparison of feedback types between
high- and low-risk gambles, since respective feedback probabil-
ities were equal in both conditions. Second, although we aimed
to disentangle expected risk from feedback probability, we could
not independently manipulate outcome magnitude and reward
prediction errors. Future studies on decision-making behavior
under risk should further examine the influence of valence, mag-
nitude, and expected risk on behavioral and ERP parameters to
describe the underlying neural mechanisms more precisely. In
particular, future research could parametrically vary risk param-
eters such that they vary from trial to trial in a decorrelated
fashion.
To conclude, the present findings indicate that the processes
underlying human decision-making are significantly affected by
decision riskiness when controlling for reward probility and
expected value. The increased P200 on negative feedback in high-
risk decisions suggests that large reward prediction errors are
processed as early as in the P200 time range. The FRN is affected
by feedback valence depending on decision riskiness. Considered
in the framework of the RL theory of the FRN, it has been sug-
gested that the reward prediction error signal is increased after
high-risk decisions compared to low-risk decisions. The later
P300 amplitude is sensitive to feedback valence as well as to the
risk associated with a decision. Thus, the P300 carries additional
information for reward processing, mainly the enhanced motiva-
tional significance of risky decisions. Due to the potential negative
consequences of high-risk choices, rapidly processing the relevant
and informative features of a context when decisions have to be
made seemed highly important for optimizing future decision-
making. Risk-taking is a central cognitive-motivational construct
accounting formany everyday decisions. In addition, understand-
ing the neurocognitive basis of risk-taking behavior might also
be central to explaining certain symptoms of psychopathologi-
cal conditions, e.g., borderline personality disorder, patients with
bipolar disorders or patients with substance dependency.
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